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Abstract
We attempt to show how relationalism might help in understanding
Bell’s theorem. We also present an analogy with Darwinian evolution in
order to pedagogically hint at how one might go about using a theory in
which one does not even desire to explain correlations by invoking common
causes.
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Motivation
In the first section we shall introduce Bell’s theorem and explain how a rela-
tional philosophy might be used in interpreting it. In the second section we will
present an analogy with Darwinian evolution via two parables. Our main aim
is pedagogy—in explaining Bell’s theorem to the layman.
Bell’s Theorem
In his seminal work [1] Bell defines formally what he means by ‘locality’ and
‘completeness’ and he convincingly proves that in order to maintain his defini-
tion of ‘locality’ one must reject his definition of ‘completeness’ (or vice versa).
His definitions are very intuitive so they are very difficult to reject—and this
is exactly the reason his theorem is so powerful. We will outline Bell’s beauti-
ful and, we would argue, irrefutable proof below and then we shall show that
using relationalism we can, as Bell proves we should, reject his definition of
‘completeness’ and/or ‘locality’. Bell’s theorem is even more difficult to dis-
solve than Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s famous theorem [2] because we have,
strictly speaking, to reject both his particular ‘completeness’ assumption and
his particular ‘locality’ one—this is merely because his ‘completeness’ assump-
tion is an integral part of his ‘locality’ assumption. But we are getting ahead
of ourselves. Let us briefly discuss Bell’s theorem and then we will discuss re-
lationalism (note that we emphatically do not refute his proof because it is, in
our opinion, wholly and profoundly correct—the aim of this note is to explain
why this is the case).
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If we have two experiments, labeled by parameters a and b, which are space-
like separated, where A and B parameterise the particular results that we might
receive in a and b respectively, then Bell assumes the following:
p(AB|abI) = p(A|aI)p(B|bI) (1)
where I is any other prior information that goes into the assignment of prob-
abilities (this might include ‘hidden variables’ if one wishes to introduce such
odd things). A,B, a and b can take a variety of different values. Bell called this
factorisation assumption ‘local causality’ with the explicit hint that any ‘com-
plete’ theory which disobeys this assumption must embody nonlocal causality
of a kind.
Jarrett [3] showed that this factorisation assumption can be split up into
two logically distinct assumptions which, when taken together, imply Eq. (1).
These two assumptions are, as named by Shimony [4], parameter independence
and outcome independence. Shimony [4] argued that orthodox quantum theory
itself obeys parameter independence, namely:
p(A|abI) = p(A|aI). (2)
This means that, in orthodox quantum theory, the probability that one predicts
for an event A in one spacetime region does not change when the parameter b
chosen in measuring an entangled subsystem elsewhere is known. Knowledge
of b doesn’t help in predicting anything about A. If parameter independence is
disobeyed then, some suggest [4], we would be able to signal between spacelike
separated regions using orthodox quantum theory and, as such, there seems to be
no harm in presuming that parameter independence failing means that nonlocal
causality is probably manifest. However, by far the more subtle assumption
implicit in Bell’s ‘locality’ assumption is outcome independence (which orthodox
quantum theory does not obey):
p(A|BabI) = p(A|abI). (3)
Knowledge of B can and does effect the predictions one makes about A in the
standard interpretation of quantum theory [4]. Bell implicitly justified assump-
tion (3) by presuming ‘completeness’ of a certain kind. If one has ‘complete’
information about the experiments then finding out the outcome B cannot teach
you anything about the probability of outcome A, hence we should presume (3)
for such ‘complete’ theories. So outcome independence does not necessarily
have anything to do with locality. Even if one were a nonlocal observer who
gathered his information nonlocally one would still assume (3) as long as that
information was ‘complete’. So two assumptions go into Bell’s factorisation as-
sumption, namely a ‘locality’ assumption (2) and a ‘completeness’ assumption
(3). Bell then proves elegantly that (2) and (3) together imply an inequality
that quantum theory disobeys. So, quantum theory does not obey Bell’s local-
ity condition (1) which is itself made up of two sub-assumptions (2) and (3).
Note that the one sub-assumption that orthodox quantum theory emphatically
does not obey is the ‘completeness’ one (3). We hope to convince you that any
justification of (3) relies on a category error1.
1One argument against this presentation [6] is that the splitting of the Bell’s factorisation
assumption into (2) and (3) is not unique, and one could equally well split the factorisation
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So we used completeness to justify demanding (3) but could we not similarly
have used completeness to demand (2)? Yes we could. So the problem arises
that it is difficult even to justify (2) as a locality assumption. The only reason
we do call (2) a locality assumption is that some theories which disobey it
could perhaps be used to signal between spacelike separated regions. The point,
however, is mute because quantum theory (in the orthodox interpretation) obeys
(2) and hence we have no problem with signalling in standard quantum theory
[4]. So Bell’s theorem seems to suggest that quantum theory is ‘incomplete’
rather than ‘nonlocal’. The very assumption that we should demand that we
can ever find the real, absolute, ontological probability independently of the
probabilities we assign to other propositions seems to be the assumption that
orthodox quantum theory disobeys in Bell’s analysis. Hence one might wish
to adopt a relational approach to probability theory [5] where we cannot even
define the probability of an event independently of the probabilities we assign
to other events—cf. Cox’s axioms of probability [7, 8, 9]. So we must, it seems,
try and interpret quantum theory in such a way that demanding (3) is simply a
category error of some sort (rather than something we desire in the first place)—
Bell’s theorem is so elegant and irrefutable that we must try to accommodate
his conclusions.
Relational theories are ones in which we do not use statements about mere
ontology, we only use facts or definitions about things that we can rationally
justify. In fact, this is the only real principle of relational theories introduced by
Leibniz, it is called the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) [10]. The PSR im-
plies another principle called the Principle of Identifying the Indiscernible (PII)
which says that if we cannot distinguish two theoretical entities by distinctions
that we can rationally justify, we should identify them. In other words, if two
things are to be distinct then they must be distinct for an identifiable reason.
No two equals are the same. These are desiderata that ensure that we do not
introduce facts, statements or distinctions in our theories which we are not ra-
tionally compelled to. However natural or obvious our assumptions sound, if we
are not rationally compelled to use them we clearly ought not to use them in
case we are mistaken (and, of course, there are lots and lots of ways we might be
mistaken). So, for example, it seems very natural and obvious to define motion
with respect to an absolute ‘flat’ space and time (like in Newton’s theory of
gravity) because we instinctively na¨ıvely feel this is the case but it turns out
that, since we are not rationally compelled to use such an absolute definition,
we ought not to. This was Einstein’s insight and it allowed him to derive a
better theory than Newton’s. In [5] we argued that such a ‘parsimonious’ re-
lational philosophy can help in interpreting and generalising probability theory
and quantum theory. For other relational approaches to quantum theory see
[11, 12, 13].
assumption into different sub-assumptions. There is no a priori reason to choose one partic-
ular way to split (1) into prior assumptions. This we agree with, but note that there are a
posteriori reasons from choosing to use Jarrett’s analysis while discussing orthodox quantum
theory. Since we are not refuting Bell’s theorem—we would rather merely adopt a different
interpretation of his assumptions—it does not matter which way we split (1), we merely split
it up into (2) and (3) for pedagogical reasons.
3
Convergency
It may seem like an odd jump to now begin discussing an analogy with Dar-
winian evolution. Nonetheless, this is exactly what we shall do and let us ex-
plain why. It is easy to see that Darwin also seemingly used such careful rational
desiderata [10]. Many people used to claim that species were eternal categories.
One might perversely say that species possessed ‘elements of biology’ that could
not change. Rabbits are rabbits because they embody some eternal ‘Rabbit-
ness’. A few hundred years ago this assumption didn’t seem too implausible.
Nonetheless, it is wrong. Utterly fallacious. Darwin argued that one was not
rationally compelled to make such an assumption. And rejecting this assump-
tion allowed him to design, with considerable effort and insight, his theories of
natural and sexual selection. It might be that an analogous rationalist approach
might help in understanding Bell’s theorem.
Inspired by [14], let us introduce a little parable. Imagine that, in some
horrible future, we find two species which look and behave in identical ways
and these two organisms each call home an island that is geologically separate
from the other. This amazes us so we search as hard as we possibly can but
we find that, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no way that a common
ancestor of the two species could have recently (in geological time) ‘rafted’,
‘tunneled’, flown or swam between the two islands. This amazes us even more.
Furthermore, we check the two organisms’ genetics and we find that they each
have exactly the same genome. Exactly the same. We must conclude that two
species have evolved separately and have exactly the same genome. This more
than merely amazes us, it shocks us to our cores, and we reel about jabbering
for years trying to understand it. We know of no (and cannot rationally justify
a) physical mechanism that can ensure a common genome for separate species.
Some biologists commit suicide, some find God, some continue to search for a
way that the two species might have evolved and conspired together regardless of
the fact they are separate, and others consider it a fluke and move on. However,
I am confident that we do not need to worry about this parable, this future will
never become reality... beyond reasonable doubt anyway.
Note that this parable suggests a reading that is exactly opposite to many
expositions of Bell’s theorem (especially Mermin’s ‘instruction set’ approach,
see [15] and references therein). One might question whether the ‘instruction
sets’ (or, equivalently, the catalogue of causes) we assign to two separated cor-
related particles are common to both. If we assume the instruction sets for each
particle should be the same for two correlated particles then we conclude that
quantum theory is surprising (it disobeys this assumption or embodies causal
nonlocality). Our parable suggests the opposite view. Turning the argument
on its head we should be utterly shocked to find that the ‘instruction sets’ or
catalogues of causes are the same in each region. We know of no (and cannot
rationally justify a) physical mechanism that can ensure common causes within
the separate regions. We are shocked if two correlated phenotypes evolved sep-
arately and ended up embodying the same genetics, but why would we not
be shocked if two correlated particles were shown to have arisen from common
causes. The orthodoxy demands that separate correlated properties should arise
from common causes. Why the distinction between the two analogous cases?
Why?
But, of course, we need another parable because perhaps the two organisms
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embody the same phenotypes merely because they live in sufficiently similar
surroundings, so it might be that the ‘instruction sets’ or common causes arise
in the environment of the two separate convergent species. So we use two dif-
ferent definitions of ‘niche’: an organism has its internal ‘genetic’ niche and it
has its external ‘environmental’ niche. Convergent species might evolve in geo-
logical separation seemingly because their environmental niches are sufficiently
similar. But just as two distinct genetics can give rise to the same phenotype,
might it not be that two distinct ‘ecological’ niches might also house a com-
mon correlated phenotype? Yes!—this happens all over the place; biology is
abundantly and wonderfully filled with convergent phenotypes that exist within
significantly distinct environmental niches. (Species like Phytophthora, Platy-
pus and Thylacine—Tasmanian Tiger—are all good examples of species which
seem to embody convergent phenotypes with respect to other separated species;
similarly, Koalas have fingerprints...). So we begin to question whether, in bi-
ology, we should ever demand that correlated phenotypes arise from common
causes. Certainly we might happily begin to question such a thing without
resorting to proclamations about nature being ‘nonlocal’.
So, another parable. Imagine in the future we again have two geologically
separate islands and two seemingly identical species. Lets say they are apes,
and that all the phenotypes that we can identify are pretty much the same:
they have the same gait, both have grey hair on their heads, squat when they
defaecate, speak the same jargon, the same kidney function etc. We would be
very surprised if they have the same genetics as long as we rule out the idea
that a recent ancestor ‘rafted’ between the islands. We catch these apes and
try to make them mate, but they do not seem to want to. We talk to them
nicely and even though it disgusts them they mate. They do not produce any
offspring or, if they do, their offspring are sterile2; they are different species
with different genetics. We are happy about this because it confirms that they
evolved separately as we would expect two geologically separate species would.
But then we ask ourselves, why do they share common phenotypes regardless
of the fact they evolved in geologically separate niches? Perhaps they share
common phenotypes because their niches are sufficiently similarly simian. So
now let us list common features of their ecological niches: the forests on each
islands have similarly shaped trees, a similar array of fruit, a similar array of
predators, the temperatures and humidity are the same, the same sun shines
down on the two islands, etc. So it seems that the two apes have evolved
common phenotypes because their niches embody common causes. This seems
obvious, right? Bell convincingly, and profoundly, proves that we cannot use
analogous sets of common causes to explain correlations in quantum theory
while maintaining causal locality, for such a ‘complete’ local theory would obey
(3).
However, note that, in biology at least, we have exactly the same problem
we had with the ‘genetics’ parable. We should look at it from exactly the op-
posite point of view. If we were to find that the environmental niches were so
amazingly similar between the islands so as to ensure that two simians existed
with the same phenotypes we would be utterly shocked. If the local ecologies
had ‘genomes’—we might call them ‘e-nomes’—we would be shocked if their ‘e-
nomes’ were the same (for exactly the same reason we would be shocked if two
2This is a biological version of the relational Principle of Identifying the Indiscernible.
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species that have evolved separately for a long time have the same genome). It
would be as if the environments of each island were conspiring with each other,
regardless of geological separation, so as to design simian apes. That would
be, by far, the more amazingly shocking conspiracy in comparison to what, in
fact, actually happens: convergent phenotypes evolve with distinct genetics and
within distinct ecologies. Common causes are the conspiracy—an analogue of
the illusion of design. So we must, in biology, be careful to distinguish com-
mon causes from ‘sufficiently similar’ uncommon causes which might arise by
natural means. We simply cannot justify the presumption of common causes.
Like a magician on stage, nature does not repeat its tricks in the same way
twice3. Bell’s theorem proves that we cannot assume an analogous common
cause design-conspiracy in quantum theory while maintaining causal locality,
but clearly it is a logical possibility that, however unpalatable, we ought not to
assume it in the first place. So, just like Bohr [16] famously rejected EPR’s [2]
assumptions and dissolved their nonlocality proof, we might yet happily reject
Bell’s [1] assumptions. And Bell (like EPR) proved that we should reject his
(their) assumptions. Two interpretations remain: some suggest that we should
search for a way to maintain causal locality [12, 16, 17, 18, 19] while others
suggest that we should use causally nonlocal common cause theories because
they are, in the least, pedagogical and easy to understand [1].
Furthermore, we can ask ourselves another penetrating question: in our
analogy we know that the islands are similar, that they have similar forests,
fruits, predators, temperatures and so forth but what, by Darwin’s beard, gives
us the sheer audacity, the silly ape-centric irrationalism, to call such things
‘causes’? Such a thing stinks of teleology. The ‘real’ causes are small unpre-
dictable changes by seemingly ‘random’ mutation. Niches don’t ‘cause’ par-
ticular phenotypes to be the case, neither as a whole nor in their particulars.
Analogously, what sheer teleological audacity do we have to discuss hidden
‘causes’ in quantum theory? Measurements don’t cause particular properties to
be the case. Phenotypes and properties merely evolve—and we can design the-
ories of probabilistic inference in which we assign probabilities to propositions
about whether such phenotypes (resp. properties) will be said to be the case in
certain niches (resp. measurements)4. Nonetheless we don’t have to give up on
causality, nor do we have to give up local causality (merely some of our mere
definitions of ‘local causality’). Local causality ought to be inviolate unless we
find something physical, that we can rationally justify, that travels faster than
light.
This analogy with biology, and Bell’s theorem itself, suggests that common
causes might be something that we desire but they are not something that
we can demand of nature; common causes are an anthropomorphic ideal. So,
now let us ask ourselves, where might this analogy fail? Correlations between
separate phenotypes arise over long periods whereas quantum correlations arise
over very short time scales. Perhaps convergency will not have enough ‘time’
to occur in quantum theory. However, ‘long’ is also defined relative to us: the
3The space of sets of possible causes for a particular phenotype to be the case is so vast
that nature is unlikely to use the same set of causes the next time. There are many ways to
evolve a cat.
4This Darwinian analogy correlates quite well with the idea of complementarity [20]. ‘Com-
plimentary’ phenotypes rarely arise within the same niche merely because they tend to arise
in different niches.
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statutory apes. Quantum correlations happen over ‘long’ periods of ‘Plank’
time.
There is one interesting way in which the analogy succeeds brilliantly. Evolu-
tion happens by ensuring that small changes of phenotypes occur unpredictably.
Quantum mechanics is, at its very core, a theory of small5 unpredictable changes
as well. Perhaps we can learn lessons from quantum theory that are similar
to those we learnt from Darwin. Rationally we cannot justify any conspiracy
or design (some demon or god which ensures correlations arise from common
causes) so rather, we must invoke a theory that explains all the ‘magical’ and
‘interesting’ correlations we see in nature by manifestly rejecting such accounts.
Instead we should search for a physical mechanism by which convergency occurs
in a causally local manner (interestingly, this is an approach suggested by Bell
himself6 in [19]). Let us learn from life.
So, this brings us back to relationalism. If we follow a relational philosophy
we need to obey the Principle of Identifying the Indiscernible (PII). Remember
that the PII ensures that if all the facts are telling us that two things are exactly
the same then we must identify them, they are the same entity and not separate
entities. Let us catalogue all the ‘causes’ for one event to be the case, or even
for it to probably be the case (one might call these ‘causes’ hidden variables).
Similarly for another correlated event at spacelike separation. The PII tells us
that these two catalogues of ‘causes’ must not be the same. The catalogues
of ‘causes’ cannot be the same otherwise we would identify indiscernibles and
we could not be discussing separate entities. This uncommon ‘cause’ principle
should not worry us—it is the very definition we use to allow us to call two
things separate in the first place. This absolves us of reasoning teleologically
about nonlocality. Instead we can reason rationally about locality. So two
species that evolve separately will, in general, be separate species that cannot
breed however similar the phenotypes that they embody. If we isolate two
species, we know of no natural mechanism which maintains common causes in
geological time, there are no ‘elements of biology’. Analogously, two separate
correlated particles are, in fact, separate because they arise from uncommon
‘causes’.
Summary and Conclusion
Bell’s theorem takes the form: ‘something’ plus casual locality logically implies
a condition—let’s call it C—and quantum theory disobeys C. Rather than fruit-
lessly argue over whether Bell’s theorem is logically sound or whether quantum
theory disobeys C, we have tried to discuss why people choose to reject causal
locality rather than the ‘something else’ that goes into Bell’s theorem. Bell was
quite explicit in noting that the reason he chose to reject causal locality was
because the ‘something’ constituted some very basic ideas about realism that
he didn’t know how to reject. That ‘something’ might be called ‘completeness’
and we obviously don’t want quantum theory to be incomplete. Hence Bell’s
conclusions rely on that ‘something’ being eminently desirable—a very anthro-
5Cf. Hardy’s ‘damn classical jumps’ [21].
6He discusses trying to define a more ‘human’ definition of locality that is weaker than his
formal definition—we would argue, in opposition, that his formal definition (1) is the ‘human’
one because it panders to an anthropomorphic ideal and is clearly not obeyed by nature.
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pomorphic criteria. Also, he noted that we are used to causally nonlocal theories
(cf. Newtonian gravity) and that they are pedagogically useful and easy to un-
derstand. These are all good, if not wholly compelling, reasons for choosing to
reject causal locality.
The major problem for those who would rather not reject causal locality (un-
til a particle or information is found to travel faster than light) is in identifying
clearly what that ‘something’ is, or what part of that ‘something’ we should
reject. We have used a relational standpoint to give two options. Clearly Bell
made some very specific assumptions about probability theory and it might be
here that we can nullify his theorem. Perhaps probability theory ought to be
relational, and thus it is not clear whether we should demand outcome inde-
pendence (3) on logical grounds [18]. If we define probabilities relationally then
what we mean by a probability will be its unique catalogue of relationships
with all other probabilities (regardless of any separation of the events to which
those probabilities refer). This doesn’t seem to convince people, perhaps be-
cause Bell’s justification for (1) didn’t seem to come from probability theory
per se but rather it stemmed from some notion of ‘completeness’ or ‘realism’
(an argument which falters when we note that Bell’s ideas of ‘realism’ or ‘com-
pleteness’ might themselves stem from a particular understanding of probability
theory [18]). Nonetheless we have provided a second way out. Instead of assum-
ing that the pertinent part of that ‘something’ is mainly to do with probability
theory, let us go to the heart of Bell’s theorem and assume that ‘something’
that we might yet reject is “correlations ought to have common causes”. This
common cause principle is the cornerstone of Bell’s theorem, but perhaps it is
just plain wrong. Like ‘elements of biology’ are just plain wrong.
We have given an example of a physical theory—if also a biological theory—
which convincingly inspires doubt about the anthropomorphic desire for com-
mon causes. This is not to suggest that Darwinian evolution necessarily disobeys
C, nor that we necessarily ought to use Darwinian principles in quantum the-
ory. Rather, “correlations ought to have common causes” might be a rejectable
assumption, and there might be good reason to reject it. If one agrees with a
relational philosophy then there is a simple argument that suggests that corre-
lations ought to have uncommon causes, cf. Leibniz’s PII. Even if you do not
accept this na¨ıve argument, we hope that the analogy with Darwinian evolution
will, in the least, convince you that the assumption of common causes might
yet possibly be rejected by rational reasoning (there are theories out there, even
if quantum theory is not yet one of them, where the presumption of common
causes for correlations just doesn’t hold true, and for good reason). Perhaps we
have even convinced you that uncommon causes are plausible, and that there
might yet be found some natural mechanism by which quantum-convergency
occurs—one that we might yet identify and investigate. It is often suggested
that causal nonlocality is a route that we logically need not take, but it is also
possible that we ought not to take it.
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